[现货]Philosophy In The Flesh pdf 夸克云 tct umd 下载 2025 azw3 kindle

What are human beings like? How is knowledge possible? What is truth? Where do moral values come from? Questi*** like these have stood at the center of Western philosophy for centuries. In addressing them, philosophers have made certain fundamental assumpti***—that we can know our own minds by introspection, that most of our thinking about the world is li***l, and that reason is disembodied and universal—that are now called into question by well-established results of cognitive science. It has been shown empirically that:Most thought is unc***cious. We have no direct c***cious access to the mechanisms of thought and language. Our ideas go by too quickly and at too deep a level for us to observe them in any *** way.Abstract concepts are mostly metaphorical. Much of the subject matter of philosopy, such as the nature of time, morality, causation, the mind, and the self, relies heavily on basic metaphors derived from bodily experience. What is li***l in our reasoning about such concepts is minimal and conceptually impoverished. All the richness comes from metaphor. For instance, we have two mutually incompatible metaphors for time, both of which represent it as movement through space: in one it is a flow past us and in the other a spatial dimension we move along.Mind is embodied. Thought requires a body—not in the trivial sense that you need a physical brain to think with, but in the profound sense that the very structure of our thoughts comes from the nature of the body. Nearly all of our unc***cious metaphors are based on common bodily experiences.Most of the central themes of the Western philosophical tradition are called into question by these findings. The Cartesian person, with a mind wholly separate from the body, does not exist. The Kantian person, capable of moral action according to the dictates of a universal reason, does not exist. The phenomenological person, capable of knowing his or her mind entirely through introspection alone, does not exist. The utilitarian person, the Chomskian person, the poststructuralist person, the computational person, and the person defined by ***ytic philosopy all do not exist.Then what does?Lakoff and Johnson show that a philosopy resp***ible to the science of mind offers radically new and detailed understandings of what a person is. After first describing the philosophical stance that must follow from taking cognitive science seriously, they re-examine the basic concepts of the mind, time, causation, morality, and the self: then they rethink a host of philosophical traditi***, from the classical Greeks through Kantian morality through modern ***ytic philosopy. They reveal the metaphorical structure underlying each mode of thought and show how the metaphysics of each theory flows from its metaphors. Finally, they take on two major issues of twentieth-century philosopy: how we conceive rationality, and how we conceive language.Philosopy in the Flesh reveals a radically new understanding of what it means to be human and calls for a thorough rethinking of the Western philosophical tradition. This is philosopy as it has never been seen before.,

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Ge***e Lakoff is professor of linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley, and the coauthor, with Mark Johnson, of Metaphors We Live By. He was one of the founders of the generative semantics movements in linguistics in the 1960s, a founder of the field of cognitive linguistics in the 1970s, and one of the developers of the neural theory of language in the 1980s and ’90s. His other books include More Than Cool Reason (with Mark Turner), Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, and Moral Politics. Mark Johnson is professor and head of the Philosophy Department at the University of Oregon and is on the executive committee of the Institute of Cognitive and Decision Sciences there. In addition to his books with Ge***e Lakoff, he is the editor of an anthology, Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor.,,

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然而，只要想到我们凭借事件关联性或空间隐喻性的时间结构就会明白，构建时间的人类的生物结构和认知结构并没有使时间成为主观的、任意的或者仅仅是文化的。某种程度上，基于我们的身体和大脑以及经常的亲身体验，我

们同样无意识、自动地在使用时间概念。空间隐喻并非任意的，而是具有很强的激发性。它们允许我们测量时间，允许我们拥有历史观念、物理科学以及更多的无价之宝。

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What are human beings like? How is knowledge possible? What is truth? Where do moral values come from? Questi*** like these have stood at the center of Western philosophy for centuries. In addressing them, philosophers have made certain fundamental assumpti***--that we can know our own minds by introspection, that most of our thinking about the world is li***l, and that reason is disembodied and universal--that are now called into question by well-established results of cognitive science. It has been shown empirically that: Most thought is unc***cious. We have no direct c***cious access to the mechanisms of thought and language. Our ideas go by too quickly and at too deep a level for us to observe them in any *** way.Abstract concepts are mostly metaphorical. Much of the subject matter of philosopy, such as the nature of time, morality, causation, the mind, and the self, relies heavily on basic metaphors derived from bodily experience. What is li***l in our reasoning about such concepts is minimal and conceptually impoverished. All the richness comes from metaphor. For instance, we have two mutually incompatible metaphors for time, both of which represent it as movement through space: in one it is a flow past us and in the other a spatial dimension we move along.Mind is embodied. Thought requires a body--not in the trivial sense that you need a physical brain to think with, but in the profound sense that the very structure of our thoughts comes from the nature of the body. Nearly all of our unc***cious metaphors are based on common bodily experiences.Most of the central themes of the Western philosophical tradition are called into question by these findings. The Cartesian person, with a mind wholly separate from the body, does not exist. The Kantian person, capable of moral action according to the dictates of a universal reason, does not exist. The phenomenological person, capable of knowing his or her mind entirely through introspection alone, does not exist. The utilitarian person, the Chomskian person, the poststructuralist person, the computational person, and the person defined by ***ytic philosopy all do not exist.Then what does?Lakoff and Johnson show that a philosopy resp***ible to the science of mind offers radically new and detailed understandings of what a person is. After first describing the philosophical stance that must follow from taking cognitive science seriously, they re-examine the basic concepts of the mind, time, causation, morality, and the self: then they rethink a host of philosophical traditi***, from the classical Greeks through Kantian morality through modern ***ytic philosopy. They reveal the metaphorical structure underlying each mode of thought and show how the metaphysics of each theory flows from its metaphors. Finally, they take on two major issues of twentieth-century philosopy: how we conceive rationality, and how we conceive language."Philosopy in the Flesh" reveals a radically new understanding of what it means to be human and calls for a thorough rethinking of the Western philosophical tradition. This is philosopy as it has never been seen before.

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Two leading thinkers offer a blueprint for a new philosophy. "Their ambition is massive, their argument important.…The authors engage in a sort of metaphorical genome project, attempting to delineate the genetic code of human thought." -The New York Times Book Review "This book will be an instant academic best-seller." -Mark Turner, University of Maryland This is philosophy as it has never been seen before. Lakoff and Johnson show that a philosophy resp***ible to the science of the mind offers a radically new and detailed understandings of what a person is. After first describing the philosophical stance that must follow from taking cognitive science seriously, they re-examine the basic concepts of the mind, time, causation, morality, and the self; then they rethink a host of philosophical traditi***, from the classical Greeks through Kantian morality through modern ***ytical philosophy.